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WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHETHER
CORPORATE MANAGERS HAVE PUBLIC
RESPONSIBILITIES?
WiLIAm H. SIMON*
Alan Wolfe's thoughtful paper resonates with what I think we should
call the Washington and Lee School of corporate jurisprudence.' It elaborates on that School's brilliant intellectual history of legal theorizing about
the corporation and on its powerful critique of conservative arguments
against managerial responsiveness to nonshareholder interests.
It also shares, I fear, a tendency to overestimate the practical stakes of
abstract concepts of the corporation and fiduciary duties. This tendency
takes three forms: first, a historical picture that portrays recent developments
as a promising departure rather than business-as-usual; second, an assumption that certain abstract conceptions of the corporation (for example,
public or private) differ dramatically in their relative hospitality or hostility
to nonshareholder interests; and third, optimism that fiduciary norms are
an important avenue through which to undertake corporate reform. I want
to express reservations about each of these points.
I.

PROMISING DEPARTURE OR

BuSm-ass-As-UsuAL?

Wolfe and the Washington and Lee School sometimes give the impression that corporate managers were deemed beholden exclusively to shareholders until the 1980s takeover movement gave managers an incentive to
invoke public responsibilities and forced everyone else to see the effects of
corporate decisions on nonshareholder constituencies. I suspect, however,
the opposite story would be more accurate. Throughout most of the century
the idea that corporate managers have public responsibility has been a
mainstream view. 2 The view was always subject to some controversy, but it
did not receive its most politically and intellectually sustained challenge until
the 1980s. On the practical level, the emergence of a new constituency of
finance capitalists prompted this challenge. These capitalists were outsiders
to the established managerial elite and discovered profit opportunities in
corporate restructurings that damaged managerial satrapies.

* Professor of Law, Stanford University.

1. This designation is prompted, of course, by the prominence of David Millon and
Lyman Johnson of Washington and Lee in this literature. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson & David
Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAW. 2105 (1990); David Millon, Redefining Corporate
Law, 24 IND. L. REv. 223 (1991); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DuKCE
L.J. 201; Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise,
92 COLuM. L. REv. 2215 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FiSCHmL,
THE EcoNomnc STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)).
2. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARv. L. RE,. 1145 (1932).
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On the theoretical level, in the 1980s hostile takeovers and managerial
conflicts of interest strained the plausibility of viewing managers as neutral
fiduciaries. The pluralist proponents of public responsibility had tended to
emphasize the convergence of interests of the various corporate constituencies. As conflicts of interest became harder to ignore, some felt more
comfortable focusing managerial loyalty on a single group rather than
charging managers with reconciling the conflicts.
That the idea of managerial public responsibility has not been deviant
is clear from historical works that describe a large contingent of elite
managers who have ostentatiously embraced public duties throughout this
century. 3 Why shouldn't they? As compared to the shareholder-agent view,
the public responsibility view seems more likely to confer prestige, to curry
public acceptance for corporate power, and to enhance managerial discretion
within the corporation.
The status of the public responsibility view has been less clear in legal
doctrine only because the issue has rarely been addressed. But the paucity
of authority itself suggests that the law has not been a major obstacle to
managerial solicitude for nonshareholder interests. I am unaware of a single
modern case in which a managerial decision has been held wrongful because
it put public interests above shareholder ones. 4 Moreover, doctrine has long
expressed general tolerance for a substantial range of public-regarding
5
managerial decisions.
This revised historical picture makes the repudiation of the shareholderagent view in the Time-Warner case 6 and the constituency statutes look
more like a restoration than the harbinger of revolution that the Washington
and Lee School would like it to be. Managers did not make very ambitious
use of their public-regarding discretion before Time-Warner, and that case
gives little reason to think they will do so now.
II.

Tim RANGE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS

My second reservation concerns the assumption Wolfe and the Washington and Lee scholars make that changing from a private to a public view
of the corporation dramatically alters the range of plausible corporate

3. E.g., JAMES

WEINSTEIN,

THE

CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE:

1900-1918

(1968).
4. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), which is often cited for the
shareholder-agent view, did not enjoin the expansion that Henry Ford had rationalized with
public interest rhetoric. It merely ordered the payout of retained earnings that exceeded the
amount the court thought necessary for the expansion.
5. Purporting to reflect longstanding doctrine, the American Law Institute's Principles
of Corporate Governance and Structure (Tent. draft no. 1, 1982) says,
[E]ven if corporate profit and shareholder gain are thereby enhanced, the corporation,
in the conduct of its business . .. may devote resources, within reasonable limits,
to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
§ 2.01(c), at 17. See id. at 39-40, n.2 (discussion and citations).
6. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
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decisions. I doubt if this is true. Since productivity in a capitalist economy
depends on the profitability of capital, it is usually easy to portray shareholder welfare as a means to public welfare. The remark often attributed
to General Motors President Charles Wilson-"What's good for General
Motors is good for the United States"-illustrates this. 7 Conversely, because
business success depends heavily on good relations and reputation with
governments, customers, suppliers, workers, and the general public, one can
always describe a corporate decision that benefits nonshareholder constituencies as serving the shareholders' long run interest in good corporate
relations and reputation.
Two of the most famous relevant cases suggest indifference to whether
corporate decisions are motivated by public or private concerns. The plaintiffs in Dodge v. Ford Motor' treated Ford's claim that the River Rouge
expansion was undertaken in the public interest as a devastating admission.
But the court was unimpressed; while declaring the preeminence of shareholder interest, it noted that the investment seemed likely to be justifiable
as well on profitability grounds. 9
And in Shlensky v. Wrigley'0 the Court denied the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove that Wrigley's refusal to have night games at Wrigley field
was motivated by concern for the "best interests of baseball."'" Recognizing
the ready availability of potential shareholder-focused, long-term relational
justifications (for example, neighborhood goodwill), the court dismissed on
2
the pleadings.'
The "nexus-of-contracts" approach to corporations has many problems,
but an inability to accommodate the interests of nonshareholder constituencies is not among them. The legal Progressives and Realists who criticized
the public-private distinction so effectively also encouraged doctrinal innovations that facilitated concern with exploitation and abuse in areas traditionally regarded as private law.' 3
Thus, the modern law of contract-with its doctrines of reliance, implied
terms, mistake, and duress-is fully able to accommodate the claims of
workers and local communities injured by plant shutdowns and takeoverinduced layoffs. Note that legal scholars like Joseph Singer and Katherine
Stone and economists like Laurence Summers, who have been arguing the
case against the corporate freedom to layoff and discharge without concern
4
for workers, have been doing so in private law terms.

7. The remark is apparently apocryphal.

DAVID HALBERSTAm, THE Fin-is 118 (1993).
8. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
9. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).

10. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill.
App. 1968).
11. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780-81 (Il. App. 1968).
12. Id.at 781.
13. E.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. Rrv. 553 (1933).
14. Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STA. L. Rnv. 614
(1988) (property rhetoric); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees As Stakeholders Under
State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 SmTsoN L. REv. 45 (1991) (implicit contract
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I do not want to push this argument too far. Doubtless, situations exist
where managers find a public interest rationale for a socially desirable
decision much more plausible than a shareholder-welfare rationale. In those
cases, the argument that managers can legitimately consider the public
interest is important. However, the opposite situation also occurs. Richard
Jackall has described a moral universe of managers in three middle-sized
corporations where public-regarding rhetoric is held in macho contempt as
a sign of weakness and sentimentality. 5 These executives feel much more
comfortable with socially responsible decisions when they can be framed in
the private rhetoric of relational prudence and long-term profitability.
III.

WHAT IS THE PUBLIC INTEREST?

The Washington and Lee School has yet to give a very definite notion
of what a vigorous regime of corporate social responsibility would look
like. If corporate social responsibility is a response to systemic problems in
the economic climate, then it requires considerably more theoretical elaboration. It is not enough simply to encourage courts to enjoin action that
"unnecessarily" injures "legitimate" interests of nonshareholders 16 without
some guidance as to what "necessity" and "legitimacy" mean here. To
mention just one of many problems, what about injuries that take the form
of "negative pecuniary externalities" such as extinction of trade or employment relations? Mainstream economics theory teaches that trade and
employment expansion in other areas will compensate for such externalities.
I am not suggesting that the ideal of public interest is too indeterminate
or subjective for systematic elaboration. On the contrary, I think the idea
could provide as coherent and plausible a basis for normative judgments as
the general norms, say, of the common law of tort and contract. However,
any effort to implement such norms as enforceable fiduciary duties will
necessarily involve the courts in reviewing business judgments of the kind
they have traditionally been reluctant to handle. Consider, for example, the
claim by Michael Piore and Charles Sabel that in many situations traditional
manufacturing corporations have two plausible responses to competitive
pressures: they try to cut wages and sweat labor, or they can train workers
and reorganize production so that labor becomes more efficient.' 7 It may
be that each strategy is equally profitable to the shareholders, but the latter
is surely better for workers. Thus, in principle, a management team that
chose the first approach would be a prime candidate for a Mitchell-type

rhetoric); Laurence Summers & Andrei Schleifer, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Alan Auerbach ed., 1988) (implicit
contract rhetoric).
15. ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAzEs: TIE WORLD OF CO.PORATE MANAGERS (1988).

16. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Franleworkfor Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REV. 579, 635-36 (1992).
17. MICHAEL J. PIoREs, THE SEcom

(1985).

INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: PossmTEs FOR PROSPERITY
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remedy. But I have no confidence that the courts could identify such
situations, and given-the business judgment rule, they seem unlikely to try.
Moreover, there is some risk that, when the Washington and Lee School
finally does elaborate its conception of the public interest, the idea of
corporate public responsibility will seem superfluous, ineffectual, or marginal. It will seem superfluous to the extent that the relevant interests can
be protected through the elaboration of private law doctrine. It will seem
ineffectual to the extent that the reform of fiduciary doctrine is not
accompanied by reform of the surrounding structures of corporate organization. And it will seem marginal to the extent that fiduciary reform is
accompanied by reform of the surrounding structures.
I see three general tendencies in current efforts to support the notion
of public responsibility as an enforceable duty. The first tendency and, to
my mind, most successful is the reliance-focused approach of Joseph Singer,
Katherine Stone, and the economists in the "implicit contracts" literature.,8
The idea here is that, in recent circumstances of economic restructuring,
some managers have been tempted to betray implicit promises of job and
compensation security on which workers have relied. These promises are
concededly unenforceable under strict contract and property law, but the
policies that underpin a variety of reliance-protective doctrines in these fields
seem applicable. These policies thus support doctrinal innovation to protect
these newly-appreciated forms of reliance, and one route would be to
interpret corporate fiduciary duties to preclude betrayal of promises of this
sort.

In the present context, however, two qualifications are in order. First,
note that this analysis has been worked out by both lawyers and economists
in private law terms of contract and property; it is not clear that we need
fiduciary duties to achieve the goal here, and we certainly do not need a
conception of the corporation as a public entity to do so. Second, under a
reliance approach, managers can satisfy their responsibilities simply by
discouraging reliance. For example, in the employment context, consistent
disclaimers of any intention to provide job and compensation security should
do the trick. It may be costly for management to take this approach, but
many companies now seem willing to incur these costs, and to the extent
they do, the effect of the public responsibility doctrine would be less
dramatic than many proponents would like to see.
The second tendency is to see public responsibility as a duty to forego
short-run payoffs in favor of larger long-run payoffs. 19 Enforcing this duty
would also require difficult judicial business judgments. Moreover, the more
plausible analyses of this subject suggest that the pressures for short-term
gain at the expense of long-term performance are broad and systemic. 20

18. See supra note 14.
19. Millon, Redefining CorporateLaw, supra note 1, at 266.
20. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, CAPITAL CHOICES: CHANGING THE
IN INDUSTRY (1992).

WAY AMERICA INVESTS
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They arise from such circumstances as the dispersion and fragmentation of
shareholdings among outside owners with limited incentives and ability to
exercise control and develop information, the assessment of institutional
shareholders on the basis of short term performance indicators, the bias of
accounting and capital budgeting practices against investments in intangibles
with remote payoffs, compensation practices that link executive pay to short
term stock prices, a governance structure that generates directors with little
personal stake in the corporation, and a variety of tax incentives that
discourage or fail to reward long term holding.
A fiduciary norm of long-term performance would fit nicely into an
ambitious scheme of structural reform designed to neutralize or reverse
pressures of the short term. But as long as the structural pressures remain
in place, reformulating fiduciary norms alone seems unlikely to make
dramatic headway.
Finally, the third tendency is to interpret fiduciary duties in terms of
some ideal of community-a set of relations broader and denser than that
of the managerial elite and a mass constituency of dispersed faceless
shareholders. 2' Again, I find this proposal attractive in principle but unlikely
to be effective in the absence of much more broad-ranging institutional
reform. As long as risky businesses are financed with capital drawn from
outside the community in which they produce, responsibilities to that
community will have to compromise significantly with responsibilities to
outside capital suppliers. As many economic communitarians have recognized, ambitious conceptions of economic community require a high degree
of local, internal finance, with attendant increased risks from loss of
diversification. Despite the increased risks, I think that many economically
plausible opportunities exist for worker or community ownership of this
sort. But without community ownership, an ambitious conception of community responsibility seems unworkable; and with community ownership, it
might seem trivial.
The demand for theories and criteria might seem unfair if we conceived
of corporate social responsibility merely as interstitial norms that operated
only in extraordinary situations not provided for in more explicit forms of
social regulation. But even in this modest view, we would still need some
paradigmatic examples to illustrate the type of decisionmaking being urged.
This is a customary function of case law.
Unfortunately, however, the two caselaw landmarks in the field-Dodge
and Time- Warner are not much help. Dodge, despite Henry Ford's pompous
rhetoric, does not seem about social responsibility at all; today the case
would be treated as involving an attempted freezeout of minority shareholders in a close corporation, and on that view, the Court seems to have
22
been right to the extent it ruled against Ford.

21. I read Alan Wolfe's paper as sympathetic to this idea. So am I. See William H.
Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1335 (1991).
22. For an account that suggests that Ford's refusal to pay dividends was an attempt to
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Time-Warner's language about a valuable corporate "culture" does
invoke public interest concerns,2 but neither the Court nor the approving
commentators have offered any serious analysis of what public interest there
might be in Time's corporate culture-as an occasional reader of the
magazine over the past thirty years, I am skeptical-and why it would have
been threatened by Paramount. Of course, for the Delaware court, public
interest is just one more incantation that triggers judicial indulgence toward
managers. But the Washington and Lee commentators, who see it as a
standard for enforceable duties, owe us more.

freeze out the Dodge brothers, see

ROBERT LACEY, FORD: THE MEN AND THE MACHINE 16677 (1988). For the leading contemporary approaches to close corporation oppression issues,
see Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 370 Mass. 842 (1976); Matter of Kemp & Beatley,
Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984).
23. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1143 n.4 (Del. 1990).

